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Abstract
In e-commerce applications, vendors can construct detailed profiles about
customers’ preferences, which is known as buyer profiling. These profiles can
then be used by vendors in order to perform practices such as price discrimi-
nation, poor judgment, etc. The use of pseudonyms and, specially, changing
pseudonyms from time to time are known to minimise profiling, minimising
the capacity of vendors to perform such practices in turn. Although there are
some frameworks and tools that support pseudonym change, there are few
proposals that suggest or directly change the pseudonym in an automated
fashion. Instead, users are usually provided with the mechanisms to change
pseudonyms but without any advise on when they should actually use these
mechanisms. In this paper, we present an approach to control buyer profiling
by means of automated pseudonym changes performed according to human
privacy attitudes. We also present an application scenario and an evaluation
of our proposal.
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1. Introduction
The explosive growth of the Internet in the last decades has caused that
more than 2 billion users as of 20121. In this environment, on-line privacy
is of great concern. Users are constantly exposed to personal information
collection and processing without even being aware of it (Fischer-Hu¨bner
and Hedbom, 2008). Information collection refers to the process of gathering
and storing data about an individual whereas information processing refers
to the use or transformation of data that have been already collected (Solove,
2006) — even possibly inferring new data from the data already collected.
There are some directives that try to regulate this massive collection and
processing of information (e.g., EU Directives 95/46/EC, 45/2001/EC, and
2002/58/EC). However, due to the very nature of the Internet itself, there
is no global governing body that could effectively enforce these regulations
in daily digital activity. Therefore, these practices are still possible with the
potential to jeopardise privacy.
We focus on a type of information processing in e-commerce environments
broadly known as buyer — or customer — profiling (Shaw et al., 2001; Such,
2011), in which vendors obtain detailed profiles of their customers based
on previous transactions, and subsequently tailor their offers regarding cus-
tomers’ tastes. These profiles can represent a serious threat to privacy. For
instance, these profiles can be used to perform price discrimination (Odlyzko,
2003). Vendors could charge customers different prices for the same good ac-
cording to the customers’ profiles, i.e., if a vendor knows that some good is of
great interest to one customer, the vendor could charge this customer more
money for this good than other customers for the same good. For instance,
in 2000, Amazon started to charge customers different prices for the same
DVD titles (Spiekermann, 2006). When the story became public, Amazon
claimed that this was part of a simple price test and discontinued this prac-
tice. Another example of privacy threat due to the use of these profiles is
what is known as poor judgment (Smith and Milberg, 1996). This is when
individuals are judged and subsequently treated according to decisions made
automatically based on incorrect or partial personal data. For instance, com-
panies usually divide their potential customers into similar groups based on
customers’ characteristics — known as customer segmentation. This practice
can lead to exclusion of people from services based on potentially distorted
1http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
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judgments (Spiekermann and Cranor, 2009).
Hansen et al. (2004) point out that pseudonyms2 should be used and, most
importantly, changed from time to time to avoid profiling. Indeed, the most
privacy-preserving option is to use transaction pseudonyms (Chaum, 1985),
i.e., to use a different pseudonym for each different transaction. The problem
is that users are often provided with the mechanisms and infrastructures that
allow them to change their pseudonyms but without any mechanism that aids
them to decide when they should actually change their pseudonyms. Even
the very few approaches that automate pseudonym change (such as Warnier
and Brazier (2010); Fritsch (2008); Fonseca et al. (2007)) do not consider the
fact that there are many cases in which the user can be interested in reusing
the same pseudonym, e.g., users may accept a potential privacy loss when
some benefit is expected if they reuse the same pseudonym, such as price
discounts, the building of a reputation, etc. (Such et al., 2013a). Indeed,
several studies have demonstrated that humans have different general atti-
tudes towards privacy (Ackerman et al., 1999; Westin, 1967; Taylor, 2003;
The Direct Marketing Association DMA (UK) Ltd, 2012): privacy fundamen-
talists are extremely concerned about privacy and reluctant to lose privacy;
privacy pragmatists are concerned about privacy but they are willing to lose
some privacy when some benefit is expected; and privacy unconcerned do
not consider privacy loss.
In this paper, we present an agent-based approach to control buyer profil-
ing automatically based on human attitudes towards privacy. In particular,
we present an approach in which an agent automatically decides whether or
not to change its pseudonym in its next interaction considering an estima-
tion of the privacy loss and the utility of reusing a pseudonym. The crucial
point is that this approach does not require human intervention for each
pseudonym change decision but agents will comply with its user’s attitude
towards privacy. For instance, if a user’s attitude towards privacy is uncon-
cerned, her/his agent will only consider the utility of reusing a pseudonym
to decide whether or not it changes its pseudonym in its next interaction.
2A pseudonym is an identifier of a subject other than one of the subject’s real names
(Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010). Human beings have been using pseudonyms in the real
world for a long time. For instance, in the 19th century when writing was a male-dominated
profession, some female writers used male names for their writings. Nowadays, in the
digital world, there are a great number of pseudonyms such as usernames, nicknames,
e-mail addresses, sequence numbers, public keys, etc.
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The remainder of this article is organised as follows, Section 2 motivates
the main contribution of this paper. Section 3 presents our proposal for
pseudonym change. Section 4 describes a privacy loss function for agent-
based e-commerce domains. Section 5 describes an application scenario for
our proposal. Section 6 presents the experiments we performed and the re-
sults we obtained when applying our proposal to this application scenario.
Section 7 presents some related work. Finally, Section 8 presents our con-
cluding remarks.
2. Motivation
There have been some important efforts in the last decades to minimize
privacy threats. Clearly, one of the most important has been the rise of
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs). According to van Blarkom et al.
(2003) PETs are “system[s] of ICT measures protecting informational privacy
by eliminating or minimising personal data thereby preventing unnecessary or
unwanted processing of personal data, without the loss of the functionality of
the information system.”. One of the main PETs that have arisen in the last
years to prevent profiling is privacy-enhancing identity management (Clauβ
et al., 2005). The building block of privacy-enhancing identity management
is Pseudonymity (Hansen et al., 2004), which is the use of pseudonyms as
identifiers (Chaum, 1985). However, only using pseudonyms for hiding the
real world identity of the users is not enough to prevent profiling. Accord-
ing to Hansen et al. (2008), one of the main questions that is relevant for
pseudonyms to avoid profiling is the amount of information that can be gath-
ered by linking the data that have been disclosed under the same pseudonym.
Social security numbers in the USA are a clear example of a pseudonym that
is usually used for a long time and in different contexts. This allows different
pieces of personal information disclosed (even in different contexts) to be
linked to each other. Moreover, it also allows the inference of other personal
information emerging from the combination of data and the application of
learning and inference techniques to obtain detailed profiles. These profiles
can then be used as explained in Section 1.
Privacy-Enhancing Identity Management Systems (PE-IMS) (Hansen et al.,
2004) (Clauβ et al., 2005) are PETs that support the management of pseudonyms
to control the nature and amount of personal information disclosed. These
systems provide users with facilities that help them to create and select
pseudonyms to be used in different online systems — so that these online
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systems act as relying parties of PE-IMS for validating the pseudonyms of
the users. The problem is that these systems do not usually warn or suggest
users about when they should change their pseudonyms. Indeed, only very
few proposals suggest or directly change the pseudonym of a user in an auto-
mated fashion, such as Warnier and Brazier (2010); Fritsch (2008); Fonseca
et al. (2007). Moreover, these approaches that automate pseudonym change
usually base on generating a new pseudonym for each new transaction, what
is known as transaction pseudonyms (Chaum, 1985). However, they do not
consider the fact that there are many cases in which the user can be inter-
ested in reusing the same pseudonym across different transactions if some
benefit is expected (e.g. price discounts, the building of a reputation, etc.),
even though this could cause a potential privacy loss.
3. Automated Pseudonym Change
Many empirical studies concluded that humans have different general at-
titudes towards privacy (Ackerman et al., 1999; Westin, 1967; Taylor, 2003;
The Direct Marketing Association DMA (UK) Ltd, 2012). Privacy funda-
mentalists are extremely concerned about privacy and very reluctant to dis-
close personal information, they feel that they have already lost too much
privacy and are reluctant to lose privacy any more. Privacy pragmatists are
concerned about privacy (i.e. they are not willing to lose privacy a priori),
but if they expect some utility (e.g. a monetary benefit) they may accept a
privacy loss in exchange of this utility. Finally, privacy unconcerned do not
consider privacy at all. For instance, a survey made in 2003 among 1010 US
adult citizens (Taylor, 2003) shows that 26% of that citizens were considered
privacy fundamentalists, 64% privacy pragmatists, and 10% privacy uncon-
cerned. A more recent survey made in 2012 among 1020 UK adult citizens
(The Direct Marketing Association DMA (UK) Ltd, 2012) shows that 31%
of that citizens were considered fundamentalists, 53% pragmatists, and 16%
unconcerned.
We model these attitudes towards privacy to control buyer profiling by
means of automated pseudonym changes. In particular, we consider that
the decision of whether or not to change a pseudonym is based on a trade-
off between the privacy that will be lost if the pseudonym is not changed
and the utility that will be lost if the pseudonym is changed. For instance,
in the case of privacy pragmatists, the agent can decide not to change its
pseudonym in the next transaction if the privacy to be lost is worth the util-
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ity to be gained. We model this problem as a multi-objective optimization
problem (Deb, 2005), in which an agent tries to minimize privacy loss while
maximizing its utilitarian benefit.
3.1. Option Quality
One of the most used approaches to solve multi-objective optimization
problems consists of transforming it into a single-objective problem3 (Fre-
itas, 2004). This is typically done by assigning a numerical weight to each
objective (evaluation criterion) and then combining the values of the weighted
criteria into a single value by adding all the weighted criteria.
In our case, agents consider two criteria: privacy loss and utility. Con-
sidering these two criteria, agents have two options: to change or not to
change its pseudonym in their next transaction. Thus, we are interested in
measuring the quality in terms of the privacy loss and the utility of each of
these options. An agent will choose the option with the highest quality. We
formally define the option set as Θ = {change, nochange}. Moreover, we
define the quality of an option as:
Definition 1 (Option Quality). Given a criterion function cp(·) that eval-
uates privacy loss, a criterion function cu(·) that evaluates utility, and weights
wp, wu ∈ [0, 1] so that wp + wu = 1, the quality Qδ of an option δ ∈ Θ is:
Qδ = wp · cp(δ) + wu · cu(δ) (1)
The specific criterion functions cp(·) and cu(·) are domain-dependent. We
provide a general privacy criterion function that can be used in e-commerce
domains in Section 4. We also provide an example of utility criterion func-
tion for a specific scenario of e-commerce in Section 5. Moreover, as privacy
loss units may be different from utility units, both criterion functions are ex-
pected to return a value in the interval [0, 1] so that they can be comparable.
Depending on the final domain, this could require a normalisation process.
3We used the single-objective approach to solve the multi-objective problem because it
is the most simple and used one, but our proposal is agnostic regarding the approach to
solve the multi-objective problem, i.e., our measures of privacy and utility could be used
within any other of the approaches to solve this kind of problems in the existing litera-
ture on multi-objective optimization. To learn more approaches to solve multi-objective
problems refer to, for instance, Deb (2005) and Freitas (2004).
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This also implies that the quality of an option δ ∈ Θ will be in that very
same interval, i.e., Qδ ∈ [0, 1].
With the option quality formula, agents are able to obtain the quality of
each of the options. Thus, they are able to choose whether or not to change
their pseudonym in the next transaction. Agents will choose the option with
the maximum quality. Formally, an agent will choose an option δ∗ ∈ Θ so
that:
δ∗ = arg max
δ∈Θ
Qδ (2)
3.2. Eliciting weights
We model privacy attitudes by appropriately setting the values for the
weights in the option quality formula (Equation 1), i.e., by setting wp and
wu. An approach to obtain appropriate values for these weights can be based
on the existing polls to obtain the privacy attitude of humans, such as The
Direct Marketing Association DMA (UK) Ltd (2012), Taylor (2003) or any
of the other surveys that Alan Westin conducted between 1978 and 2004
(Kumaraguru and Cranor, 2005). These polls are able to obtain a degree of
privacy attitude, which can be directly matched to a wp value (and then we
obviously obtain wu = 1− wp).
For privacy fundamentalists, wp will be set to wp = 1 (so wu = 0). This
is because privacy pragmatists will only try to minimize privacy loss and
will not consider utility at all. For privacy unconcerned, wp will be set to
wp = 0 (so wu = 1), because privacy unconcerned do not care about privacy
loss. If wp 6= 1 ∧ wp 6= 0, we are modelling privacy pragmatists. Moreover,
the specific value for wp and wu will vary according to the degree of privacy
attitude of the particular user, i.e., to what extent a user values privacy in
front of utility. For instance, a person that has a degree of privacy attitude
that is considered pragmatist but it is very close to unconcerned may be
modelled with a wp that will be close to 0.
In the experimental results (Section 6) we use three values that we con-
sider representative for three main pragmatic attitudes wp: 0.25, 0.5, and
0.75. We set wp = 0.25 to model pragmatic users that value privacy as less
important than utility, wp = 0.5 to model pragmatic users that value privacy
and utility as equally important, and wp = 0.75 to model pragmatic users
that value privacy as more important than utility. However, many other val-
ues for wp and wu are also possible to model a pragmatic attitude towards
privacy as long as wp 6= 1, wp 6= 0, and wp + wu = 1 are satisfied.
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3.3. Pseudonym Management
As our approach is aimed to be completely automated, users do not need
to generate pseudonyms by themselves. Instead, we assume that agents are
running on top of agent platforms (which are the software infrastructures
that facilitate the development and execution of agent-based applications)
that provide facilities for generating new unique and random pseudonyms
automatically when they decide to change their pseudonym. For instance,
Magentix2 (Such et al., 2013b) provides all the needed mechanisms for agents
to manage their pseudonyms. Therefore, if an agent that is running on top of
Magentix2 decides (using the mechanism presented in this paper) to change
its pseudonym, the agent will call to the specific methods of the API that
Magentix2 provides to generate a new pseudonym for this agent without
requiring direct human intervention. Furthermore, the link between this
pseudonym and the identity of its human holder and the link between this
pseudonym and the other pseudonyms of the same human holder will not
be publicly known. That is, a priori, agents will not know the real world
identities of the users they are interacting on behalf of, neither will they
know if two different pseudonyms belong to the same agent.
We also assume the use of other privacy-enhancing technologies so that
only the pseudonym that an agent is using can be re-identified from interac-
tion to interaction. In particular, we assume that payments are carried out
using some kind of anonymous payment mechanism and deliveries are carried
out using some anonymous delivery system. Hence, credit card numbers and
delivery addresses do not need to be disclosed when an agent acquires a good.
For instance, any payment system similar to the untraceable electronic cash
presented by Chaum et al. (1990) can be used for anonymous payments. For
anonymous deliveries, the privacy-preserving physical delivery system pre-
sented by Aı¨meur et al. (2005) can be used. Finally, we also assume the use
of anonymous communication (e.g. TOR (Dingledine et al., 2004)) so that
the IP address and other whereabouts are hidden.
4. Privacy Loss
In this section, we present a general privacy loss function for pseudony-
mous e-commerce scenarios. Privacy loss is defined in previous works (Lebanon
et al., 2006; Li and Li, 2007) as the identifiability of an individual and the
personal information that can be linked together and to the individual in
case he/she is successfully identified. Identifiability is the ability from an
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attacker’s point of view of sufficiently identify an individual from a set of
individuals (the identifiability set) (Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010; Pfitzmann
and Kohntopp, 2001). In our setting, a seller can sufficiently identify a buyer
if the buyer re-uses the same pseudonym even if other identifiable information
(such as credit card numbers) is hidden by using the technologies described
in Section 3.3. This is because, as also described in Section 3.3, pseudonyms
are generated randomly and uniquely, so those buyers that do not change
their pseudonyms can easily be distinguished from the rest by the sellers.
As sellers are able to identify buyers if they re-use their pseudonyms, they
are also able to establish the linkability of all the transactions performed
by a buyer re-using the same pseudonym. Linkability means that from an
attacker’s point of view, two different items of interest (in this case two
transactions) can be related to each other (Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010;
Pfitzmann and Kohntopp, 2001). The seller can process (as explained bel-
low) all the linked transactions performed under the same pseudonym and
obtain a profile of buyer’s tastes, which are consistently considered personal
information in the related literature (Rannenberg et al., 2009; Hildebrandt
and Gutwirth, 2008). This disclosure of personal information will be seen
as acceptable/unacceptable depending on the privacy attitude of the buyer,
e.g., a privacy fundamentalist will see any disclosure of personal information
unacceptable. Note that the seller does not need to know the real identity
of the buyer (or other personal information) to use the constructed profile in
future transactions against the buyer (e.g., performing price discrimination,
poor judgement, etc.). That is, once the seller has constructed a particular
profile about a buyer, the seller only needs that this buyer uses the same
pseudonym in the next transaction to be able to identify the buyer as the
individual with that particular profile and, thus, to use this profile against
the buyer.
We assume that seller agents follow an approach to build buyer agents’
profiles similar to Serrano et al. (2013). Based on this, a seller agent marks
goods that are not accepted by a buyer agent over the course of a purchase
(or transaction) as a negative instance (class “-”), while a seller agent marks
goods that buyer agent accepts to buy as a positive instance (class “+”).
The seller agent uses all the collected instances about a buyer agent to train
a statistical classifier. Thus, the resulting trained classifier models the buyer
agent’s tastes with a given accuracy.
To avoid profiling, buyer agents need to prevent seller agents from ob-
taining an accurate classifier for the tastes of the buyer agents’ users. Thus,
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a privacy loss metric for this domain can be defined regarding the estimation
that a buyer agent can make about the possible accuracy of the classifier that
a seller agent might have constructed based on their previous transactions.
To this aim, what we propose is that buyer agents train themselves classifiers
with the very same instances that seller agents will have available to construct
their own classifier, i.e., the transactions that each buyer agent completed
using the same pseudonym with the same seller. Then, buyer agents can
test the accuracy of their classifiers with their users’ real preferences to know
the number of correctly classified instances and have an estimation of the
accuracy of the classifiers that sellers might have constructed about them.
We denote by G = {g1, . . . , gl} the nonempty and finite set of on-sale
goods. A = {a1, . . . , ak} is a nonempty and finite set of attributes so that
a : G → Vai is a partial function for any a ∈ A, where Va is the domain of
a. We also denote I
pi,pj
n = {{g1, c1}, . . . , {gm, cm}} as the set of m instances
(positive and negative) resulting from n transactions4 of a buyer agent under
pseudonym pi with a seller agent under pseudonym pj, where each gi ∈ G
is a good and ci ∈ {+,−} is the class that states whether a good complies
with the preferences of the corresponding user or not. Moreover, we define a
function h
I
pi,pj
n
: G→ {+,−}, which is the statistical classifier that is trained
with I
pi,pj
n . Although determining the best classifier to be used is out of the
scope of the paper, we used three different classifiers for our experiments
that have been proved to offer accurate results in this domain (as detailed in
Section 6). We also define a function f : {+,−} × {+,−} → {0, 1}, which
returns 1 if the two classes passed are equal or 0 otherwise. Finally, we define
a set T = {(gi, ci) | gi ∈ G ∧ ci ∈ {+,−}} of random generated goods with
its correct class according to the users’ preferences. This set is used to test
the classifier to obtain its accuracy. Based on this, we define the privacy loss
function as:
Definition 2 (Privacy Loss). Given a buyer agent with pseudonym pi and
a seller agent with pseudonym pj, the set of instances I
pi,pj
n resulting from n
transactions between pi and pj, the classifier hIpi,pjn (trained with I
pi,pj
n ), and
a set of test goods T ,the privacy loss L(pi, pj, n) is defined as:
4Note that as shown later on in Section 6, one transaction could result in more than
one instance.
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L(pi, pj, n) =
1
|T | ·
∑
(g,c)∈T
f(h
I
pi,pj
n
(g), c) (3)
With this function, the buyer agent can estimate the accuracy of the
profile that the seller agent could have about the buyer agent’s preferences
after a number of transactions.
We now define the privacy criterion function based on this privacy loss
function:
Definition 3 (Privacy Criterion Function). Given a buyer agent with
pseudonym pi and a seller agent with pseudonym pj, and the number n of
completed transactions between them under these pseudonyms, the privacy
criterion function cp(δ) of an option δ ∈ Θ for the next transaction n+ 1 is:
cp(δ) =
{
1− L(pi, pj, n+ 1) if δ = nochange
1 if δ = change
For the nochange option we estimate the privacy loss that the next trans-
action n + 1 will cause, considering I
pi,pj
n+1 = I
pi,pj
n
⋃{(gn+1,+)}, so that gn+1
is the good that the buyer agent is willing to purchase in the next trans-
action. For the change option we consider that it has the highest quality
(cp(change) = 1). This is because we assume that when a buyer agent
changes its pseudonym in its next transaction with the seller agent, the seller
agent is not able to re-identify the pseudonym5.
5. Application Scenario
We consider an electronic market where seller agents and buyer agents
trade wines on behalf of their users. Seller agents act on behalf of wine
merchants. Buyer agents act on behalf of the users that are interested in
acquiring wines. Agents in the e-marketplace follow the negotiation protocol
depicted in Figure 1 (Serrano et al., 2013). A buyer agent makes a request
to purchase a bottle of wine with a request message. This message can be
replied by the seller agent with either a model message (which means that
5This assumption should be relaxed in other domains such as inter-vehicle communi-
cation systems in which pseudonym changes have been proved as not being enough to
prevent profiling (Wiedersheim et al., 2010).
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Figure 1: Negotiation Protocol for the Wine e-marketplace scenario.
the requested wine is available) or an alternative message (which means that
the requested wine is not available but there is another one that is very
similar). Then, the buyer agent can reply to both messages with: an accept
message (which means that the buyer agent accepts the wine offered), a quit
message (which means that the negotiation was broken by the buyer agent),
or a request message (which means that the agent requests a new different
bottle of wine).
We based on the wine attributes considered in the preference modelling
approach described in Aydoan and Yolum (2010). Thus, we consider the fol-
lowing attributes to describe wines: colour, body, flavour, sugar, and country.
The possible values for each of these attributes are shown in Table 1.
Attribute Values
Colour red, rose, white
Body light, medium, full
Flavour delicate, moderate, strong
Sugar dry, offDry, sweet
Country France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, USA
Germany, Australia, New Zealand
Table 1: Considered Wine Attributes.
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We define a utility function for this specific scenario based on customer
loyalty programs6. Retaining customer loyalty is crucial in electronic com-
merce because the value of an on-line store is largely determined by the
number of its loyal customers (Lee et al., 2000). Many vendors use different
approaches to achieve customer loyalty such as price discounts, allotment of
points that can be used for future purchases, etc.
Loyalty programs usually reward buyers with benefits as they buy more
goods. The incentive is for buyers to spend enough to gain access to differ-
ent levels of rewards (Dowling and Uncles, 1997). We specifically assume a
loyalty program with two levels: emerald level, and gold level. When a buyer
agent interacts for the first time with a seller agent, the seller agent does
not consider the buyer agent as member of any of the levels in the loyalty
program. However, if the buyer agent interacts for the second time with a
seller agent, the seller agent considers the buyer agent as emerald level mem-
ber. This means that the seller agent provides a 5% discount to the overall
buyer agent purchase in this transaction. From this moment on, each time
the buyer agent interacts with the seller agent, it will receive a 5% discount
as well as one point. When the agent reaches 50 points, the seller agent will
upgrade the buyer agent to gold level member. From this moment on, the
seller agent provides a 10% discount to the overall buyer agent purchases.
We define a utility function that models this loyalty program as follows:
Definition 4 (Utility). Given a buyer agent with pseudonym pi and a seller
agent with pseudonym pj, and the number n of transactions between them un-
der these pseudonyms, the utility is:
U(pi, pj, n) =

0 if n = 1
0.5 + n−2
100
if n ≥ 2 ∧ n ≤ 51
1 if n > 51
The rationale for this utility function is described as follows. In the first
transaction, the buyer agent receives no utility. In the second transaction it
receives utility 0.5 because the buyer agent is receiving half the maximum
discount that the seller agent provides, that is, 5% discount in front of 10%
maximum discount. Moreover, from n > 2 to n ≤ 51 the buyer agent
6Choosing the most suitable utility function for either this specific scenario or other
agent-based e-commerce scenarios is out of the scope of this paper.
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receives 0.5 + n−2
100
because this models that the buyer agent is obtaining the
5% discount but it is also cumulating points in order to reach 50 points and
be gold level member. Finally, from n > 51 the buyer agent receives utility
1 because it is considered as gold level loyalty program member so that it
receives the maximum discount possible, that is, 10% discount.
We define the utility criterion function for this scenario as:
Definition 5 (Utility Criterion Function). Given a buyer agent with pseudonym
pi and a seller agent with pseudonym pj, and the number n of completed trans-
actions between them under these pseudonyms, the utility criterion cu(δ) of
an option δ ∈ Θ for the next transaction (n+ 1) is:
cu(δ) =
{
U(pi, pj, n+ 1) if δ = nochange
0 if δ = change
We consider that the utility criterion function returns 0 when changing
the pseudonym in the next transaction (n+1), this is because the seller agent
will not recognize the buyer agent with the new pseudonym. The seller agent
will consider that it is the first time that it is interacting with that buyer
agent. Therefore, the seller agent will not consider the buyer agent as member
of any of the loyalty program levels.
6. Experimental Results
We conducted several simulations considering buyer and seller agents.
In each of these simulations, each buyer agent performs 100 different trans-
actions, i.e., each buyer agent performs 100 different purchases of a bottle
of wine. Moreover, to support the findings with statistic significance, each
transaction was repeated 1000 times. Each transaction involves a negotia-
tion with a seller agent to get the desired wine. We assume that negotiations
are always successful, i.e., buyer agents always purchase a bottle of wine.
However, we consider that negotiations can randomly involve from 1 up to
10 rounds of the protocol depicted in Figure 1. That is, we simulate negotia-
tions in which a buyer agent and a seller agent perform a maximum number
of 10 rounds of the protocol. Based on this, a seller agent marks wines that
are not accepted by a buyer agent as a negative instance (class “-”), while a
seller agent marks the first requested wine and the wine of the last step in
the protocol (i.e., the wine that the buyer agent accepts to buy) as a positive
instance (class “+”).
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Figure 2: Privacy lost as the number of transactions with the same pseudonym increases.
For each new transaction, the buyer agent uses all of the wines that
it has available — those generated in all of its previous transactions with
the seller agent as well as the wine that is willing to purchase in the next
transaction — as instances to train a classifier. The buyer agent then uses
the privacy loss function (Equation 3) to calculate the number of correctly
classified instances out of the total number of instances from an extra set of
test instances (positive and negative). The buyer agent randomly generates
these test instances according to its user’s preferences. The result of the
privacy loss function is used as an estimation of the accuracy of the profile
that the seller agent may have constructed on the buyer agent’s user.
6.1. Pseudonym Change Effectiveness
In this section, we describe the experiment we performed to ascertain to
what extent changing pseudonyms can reduce the accuracy of the profiles that
seller agents can construct about buyer agents. To this aim, we considered
a buyer agent that represents a user with the following preferences:
(body = light∧flavour = delicate)∨(sugar = dry∧country = Portugal)
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We repeat the overall simulation (i.e., 100 purchases) three times so that
each time the buyer agent is using a different classifier. Specifically, we con-
sider the same classifiers as in Serrano et al. (2011), which are proved to
be effective and accurate to learn preferences in this kind of domains. These
classifiers are: the J48 decision tree algorithm (an implementation of the C.45
algorithm), the NNge classification rules algorithm (Nearest neighbor like al-
gorithm using non-nested generalized exemplars) and the BayesNet classifier
that is a classifier based on Bayesian networks. We use the implementation of
these classifiers that is freely available in the Weka7 open source data mining
software.
Figure 2 shows the results we obtained. As it can be observed, the more
transactions the buyer agent carries out with the seller agent, the more ac-
curate are all the models that the seller agent constructs with all of the
classifiers. Moreover, this relationship among transactions and accuracy is
not linear. Instead, the accuracy rapidly achieves the maximum of 100% of
accuracy. After 10 transactions, the accuracy is almost 80%. Moreover, after
30 transactions the seller agent is able to obtain a 100% accurate model of
the preferences of the buyer agent’s user. This means that the seller agent
has a complete and certain profile on the preferences of the buyer agent’s
user, which clearly represents a threat for the privacy of the buyer agent’s
user.
With only one transaction, the seller is only able to construct classifiers
that obtain an accuracy of 50%, which means that the corresponding clas-
sifier is not able to distinguish between what the buyer agent’s user prefers
and what he/she does not prefer. This confirms the hypothesis made in
most of the privacy-enhancing technologies literature, i.e., the most privacy-
preserving option is to use a different pseudonym for each transaction (known
as transaction pseudonyms in the privacy-enhancing technologies literature
(Hansen et al., 2008)).
6.2. Automated Pseudonym Change
In this section, we assume the same preference profile for the buyer agent
as the one described in the previous section. However, we repeated the sim-
ulation changing the privacy attitude of the buyer agent, i.e., we considered
different values for wp and wu for the buyer agent. In particular, we re-
7http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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Figure 3: Number of pseudonym changes per each wp value.
peated the simulation 5 times with the following values for wp (recall that
wu = 1− wp): 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.
Figure 3 shows the number of pseudonym changes performed by the buyer
agent during 100 transactions with the seller agent for each wp value. For the
sake of simplicity and clarity, we only comment the results obtained with the
J48 decision tree algorithm because the results obtained with the other two
classifiers were very similar (as one could expect from the results obtained
in the experiment detailed in the previous section in which all classifiers per-
formed very similar). As it can be observed, for low values of wp (0 and 0.25)
the buyer agent did not perform any pseudonym change. This is because with
this wp values the buyer agent acts either as a privacy unconcerned (wp = 0)
or as a privacy pragmatist that values more utility than privacy (wp = 0.25).
For the rest of wp values the buyer agent performs pseudonym changes in
some of its 100 transactions with the seller. Moreover, the higher the value
of wp, the more concerned is the buyer agent about its privacy. Thus, the
buyer agent performs the needed pseudonym changes so that it loses the less
possible privacy. The highest number of pseudonyms changes occurs when
wp = 1, because the buyer agent models a fundamentalist approach to pri-
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Figure 4: Q value for changing (or not) the current pseudonym in the next transaction.
Values for wp: 0.0, 0.25.
vacy so that it tries to prevent privacy loss to the greater possible extent.
Thus, it changes its pseudonym for each new transaction.
In order to provide the reader with more details about the performance of
the buyer agent according to the different values for wp, Figures 4 and 5 show
the quality value (Q) of changing and not changing the pseudonym per each
transaction performed with the seller agent. Moreover, to improve visibility,
we split the results into two figures: Figure 4 shows the results obtained for
wp: 0.0, 0.25; while Figure 5 shows the results obtained for wp: 0.5, 0.75, 1.0.
Figure 4 shows that for wp: 0, 0.25 the quality value of not changing the
pseudonym in the next transaction is always higher than the quality value
of changing the pseudonym in the next transaction. Thus, the agent does
not perform any pseudonym change in any of both cases. Moreover, the
results obtained for both cases are very similar. The quality of changing is
always the same. This is because the utility criterion function of changing
returns 0 and the privacy criterion function of changing returns 1. Therefore,
the quality of changing the pseudonym is always 0 for wp = 0 (i.e., the
privacy quality is 1 but after being weighted it becomes 0) and 0.25 for
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wp = 0.25. Regarding the quality of not changing, when wp = 0, it follows
exclusively the pattern described by the utility function defined in Section 5.
Thus, when the transaction number is 1, the quality value of not changing
the pseudonym in the next transaction is 0.5 (the value returned by the
utility function for transaction 2). This corresponds to the emerald level
loyalty program membership. Thus, during the following 50 transactions,
the quality of not changing increases according to the utility function until
reaching the maximum possible value. Then, it obtains the maximum utility
of 1, which corresponds to the gold level loyalty program membership. From
this moment on, the quality of not changing is always 1.
The quality of not changing when wp = 0.25 behaves a little different. In
the first transactions (from 1 to 20), the quality of not changing exhibits a
decreasing pattern. This is because the privacy that is being lost devalues the
utility that is achieved. However, from 20 transactions on, the privacy loss
reaches its maximum (see Figure 2) because the seller agent achieves a nearly
perfect model of the buyer agent’s preferences. Thus, the privacy quality will
be 0. This implies that the quality of not changing starts behaving like the
utility function but weighted with 0.75. This is because when wp = 0.25,
wu = 0.75. Therefore, when the utility function reaches its maximum (from
52 transactions), the maximum of the quality of not changing is 0.75.
As we can see in Figure 5, for wp = 1 the quality value of changing the
pseudonym in the next transaction is always higher than the quality value
of not changing the pseudonym in the next transaction. Therefore, when
wp = 1, the buyer agent always changes its pseudonym in the next transac-
tion. As a consequence, the seller agent can infer very little from the buyer
agent, so the privacy loss is very low and constant. This is the most privacy-
preserving option and models a fundamentalist attitude towards privacy, i.e.,
it minimizes privacy loss without considering the utility that reusing the same
pseudonym could cause (wu = 0).
Figure 5 also shows the results for pragmatic attitudes with wp: 0.5, 0.75.
In both cases, we can observe that the quality value of not changing the
pseudonym is higher than the quality value of changing the pseudonym most
of the times. However, there are some times in which the quality value of
not changing the pseudonym falls under the quality value of changing the
pseudonym. This is when the buyer agent decides to change its pseudonym
for the next transaction.
We can also see in Figure 5 that the quality of not changing the pseudonym
in the next transaction exhibits a very similar behaviour in both cases (wp:
19
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90
O
p t
i o
n  
Q u
a l i
t y  
( Q
δ)
Transaction Number
wp=1.0, δ=change
wp=1.0, δ=nochange
wp=0.75, δ=change
wp=0.75, δ=nochange
wp=0.5, δ=change
wp=0.5, δ=nochange
Figure 5: Q value for changing (or not) the current pseudonym in the next transaction.
Values for wp: 0.5, 0.75, 1.0.
0.5, 0.75). It has a phase in which the quality value of not changing the
pseudonym increases, followed by a phase in which the quality value de-
creases. We explain this behaviour as follows. The quality of not changing
increases in each transaction because the increase in utility is higher than in
privacy loss. However, there is a point in which the privacy that is expected
to be lost is high enough so that the utility that is expected to be gained
is not worth it. Thus, the quality of not changing starts decreasing. This
tendency stops when the quality of not changing decreases below the quality
of changing so that the buyer agent performs a pseudonym change. Due
to the pseudonym change, the privacy loss is restarted because the buyer
agent assumes that the seller agent has no instance corresponding to the new
pseudonym to train its classifier. Moreover, the utility is also restarted be-
cause when a buyer agent changes its pseudonym, the seller agent will treat
the buyer agents as not pertaining to any loyalty program level. From this
moment on, with a privacy loss criterion function that returns a good qual-
ity in terms of privacy loss, utility starts becoming again the driving force.
Therefore, the quality of not changing starts increasing again. This pattern
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is repeated throughout all of the transactions. Moreover, we can observe that
the length of this pattern (in terms of number of transactions) depends on
how the buyer agent values privacy in front of utility. Thus, for wp = 0.75
(the buyer agent values privacy more than utility) this length is shorter than
for wp = 0.5 (the buyer agent values privacy and utility equally).
6.3. Multiple Buyers
Another important factor that should be considered is the complexity of
users’ tastes (or preferences) regarding the specific product to be acquired
(i.e., in our case the wines that the user likes). In this way, we claim that more
complex tastes are more difficult to learn, and thus, for the same number of
transactions they involve less privacy loss. That is, a buyer agent with simple
tastes will need equal or greater pseudonym changes than a buyer agent with
complex product preferences in order to comply with the privacy attitude of
its human user.
ID Wine Preferences
1 (body = light)
2 (body = light ∧ flavour = delicate)
3 (body = light ∧ flavour = delicate)
∨
(sugar = dry ∧ country = Portugal)
4 (sugar = dry ∧ colour = red ∧ body = medium∧
flavour = moderate ∧ country = France)
∨
(sugar = sweet ∧ colour = white ∧ body = light∧
flavour = delicate ∧ country = USA)
5 (sugar = dry ∧ colour = red ∧ body = medium∧
flavour = moderate ∧ country = France)
∨
(sugar = sweet ∧ colour = white ∧ body = light∧
flavour = delicate ∧ country = USA)
∨
(sugar = sweet ∧ colour = rose ∧ body = medium∧
country = Portugal)
∨
(sugar = offDry ∧ colour = red ∧ body = full∧
flavour = strong ∧ country = NewZealand)
Table 2: Buyer agent’s wine preferences (or tastes), ordered by complexity — i.e., ordered
in terms of how difficult they are to be learned from individual transactions.
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To prove this claim, in this section we consider multiple buyers with dif-
ferent wine preferences (or wine tastes) and with different privacy attitudes
(specified by giving different values to wp). In particular, we consider five
different wine preferences shown in Table 2 and the very same five privacy at-
titudes considered in the previous section (wp = {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}). Each
buyer is a combination of one wine preference and one privacy attitude, so
we consider 25 different buyers.
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Figure 6: Number of pseudonym changes per each preference ID and per each wp value.
We conducted a simulation in which each buyer performs 100 different
transactions with the same seller (see Section 6.4 for experiments considering
multiple sellers). Figure 6 shows the results we obtained for this experiment.
As we can see, buyers that have a privacy attitude that is either uncon-
cerned (wp = 0, wu = 1) or pragmatic but that value utility as being much
more important than privacy loss (wp = 0.25, wu = 0.75) never change their
pseudonym regardless the complexity of their wine preferences (or tastes).
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This is because buyer agents with that privacy attitudes and for this particu-
lar environment will always consider that the utility they are receiving in the
form of price discounts is worth the privacy loss. That is, on the one hand
buyers that are unconcerned do not consider privacy loss at all. On the other
hand, pragmatic buyers that value utility as more important than privacy
loss consider that the discounts the seller will apply to their purchases (rep-
resented in the form of a utility function in Section 5) are worth the privacy
loss due to not changing their pseudonyms.
We can also see in Figure 6 that the specific wine preferences do have a
clear effect on the number of changes that buyers perform if they follow a
pragmatic attitude that values privacy as equally or more important than
utility (wp = 0.5, wu = 0.5 and wp = 0.75, wu = 0.25 respectively). In
particular, we can clearly see that the more complex are the wine preferences
the less pseudonym changes buyers need to carry out. This is because, for
the same number of transactions, the more complex are the wine preferences
the less accurate the classifier constructed (that models buyers’ tastes) is.
Thus, for the same number of transactions buyers with more complex wine
preferences will experience less privacy loss. As a consequence, they will
need less pseudonym changes for the same number of transactions than other
buyers that have wine preferences that are easier to learn and that will imply
more privacy loss. Indeed, we can see that, regarding buyers with privacy
attitude wp = 0.5, they do not need to perform any pseudonym change to
comply with that privacy attitude if their wine preferences are either 4 or 5,
which are the most difficult to learn.
Another interesting result is that buyers that have a privacy attitude wp =
0.75 and wine preferences 2 and 3 perform the same number of pseudonym
changes. This is because of the very nature of the privacy loss function, which
is not completely lineal with the number of transactions (though it will always
be monotonically increasing with the number of transactions performed).
Note however, that the exact privacy loss will be different for both cases but
it will not be different enough to imply a different amount of pseudonym
changes. Thus, we can state that given two buyers with the same privacy
attitude but different wine preferences, for the same number of transactions
the buyer with the most easy-to-learn preferences (from the two different
wine preferences) will need equal or greater pseudonym changes than the
buyer with the least easy-to-learn preferences to comply with the privacy
attitude of its user.
Finally, we can see in Figure 6 that for buyers with a fundamentalist
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attitude (wp = 1, wu = 0), the results are equal for each all of the prefer-
ences. This is because fundamentalists will only consider privacy loss, i.e.,
they will try to prevent privacy loss to the greater possible extent. The most
privacy preserving option is always to change their pseudonym (transaction
pseudonyms), because not changing them will always imply a loss of privacy
regardless the complexity of its preferences. That is, the more complex pref-
erences are, the less privacy loss, but there will be always a privacy loss by
re-using the same pseudonym, so a fundamentalist will always try to avoid
it.
To sum up, we can conclude that although the most important factor that
will drive pseudonym change to comply with a privacy attitude is precisely
the privacy attitude itself, it is clear that how difficult it is to learn the
tastes of a buyer will always influence the final number of pseudonym changes
needed to comply with the privacy attitude, because this will determine
the amount of privacy that is lost by re-using a pseudonym. Thus, for the
same privacy attitude, different complexity of the buyer’s tastes will imply a
different number of pseudonym changes required to comply with that privacy
attitude.
6.4. Multiple Sellers
Finally, we would also like to ascertain whether the number of sellers in a
particular scenario could also have any impact on the number of pseudonym
changes required to comply with users’ privacy attitudes. In particular, we
repeated an experiment considering a varying number of sellers from 1 to 50.
In each repetition, we considered 5 buyers with the same product preferences
(or tastes) and with different privacy attitudes wp (i.e., 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1)
that perform 100 transactions. For each transaction, each buyer picks ran-
domly a different seller8.
Figure 7 shows the number of pseudonym changes per number of sellers
considered and for each type of agent. We can see two different patterns, one
in which the number of pseudonym changes remains the same, and another
8We are only interested in ascertaining how interacting with different sellers could
affect the number of pseudonym changes needed to preserve the desired level of privacy in
exchange of the price discounts. Thus, the decision to select the most appropriate seller in
each interaction is beyond the scope of this paper, e.g., this decision could be made based
on who the sellers that offer the highest discounts are, etc.
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one in which the number of pseudonyms changes drops as the number of
sellers increases:
1. The number of pseudonym changes remains the same regardless the
number of sellers when wp = {0, 0.25, 1}. For wp 0/1 it is clear that the
buyer will always maintain/change its current pseudonym in its next
interaction because of its unconcerned/fundamentalist privacy attitude,
i.e., it is only interested in utility/privacy respectively. For wp = 0.25
we have that, as shown in Section 6.2 for only one seller, the buyer never
changes its pseudonym due to its privacy attitude that values more the
expected benefit than the privacy loss, and in this case the discount it
receives is worth the privacy it losses. Thus, when the number of sellers
increases the privacy loss will be even less than with only one seller,
so that the utility received will still be worth the privacy loss and no
pseudonym change will be performed.
2. The number of pseudonym changes drops as the number of sellers in-
creases for wp = {0.5, 0.75}. This is because for these values of wp the
privacy attitude is one pragmatic that values privacy as being greater
or equally important to privacy loss. Thus, when the number of sellers
increases, the probability of interacting with the same seller decreases
(recall that we are modelling buyers that choose sellers randomly). As
the number of interactions with the same seller decreases, the privacy
loss will decrease as well. Therefore, these agents need less pseudonym
changes to maintain the same amount of privacy loss.
7. Related Work
There have also been proposed agent-based approaches to support the
management of pseudonyms in e-commerce, but only to a limited extent.
For instance, users connect to the IntelliShopper agent (Menczer et al., 2002)
using a pseudonym to avoid the link between the profiles that IntelliShopper
has about customers and their real identity. Moreover, users can use dif-
ferent pseudonyms for IntelliShopper to have separate profiles for separate
activities. However, the authors of this work leave users with the responsi-
bility of creating their pseudonyms and they do not provide any pseudonym
management facility.
Another agent-based approach for providing general support for pseudonymity
is providing this support from the agent platform (AP), which is the software
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Figure 7: Number of pseudonym changes per number of sellers and for each type of agent.
infrastructure that facilitates the development and execution of agent-based
applications. This support aids agent developers to use pseudonymity with-
out having to implement their own solutions. However, only few APs imple-
ment some kind of support for pseudonymity. Magentix (Such et al., 2011a),
Secmap (Ugurlu and Erdogan, 2005), AgentScape (Quillinan et al., 2008)
and Cougaar (Newman, 2004) assign a unique identity for each agent that it
can use to authenticate itself to other agents. Using this identity, agents can
act pseudonymously, i.e., agents can act on behalf of their principal without
using the identity of their principal. However, agents cannot hold more than
one pseudonym, i.e., principals should use a different agent each time they
want to use a different pseudonym.
Warnier and Brazier (2010) also present a mechanism for the AgentScape
AP that offers pseudonymity. At will, agents can ask AgentScape for new
pseudonyms. AgentScape also offers an automatic pseudonym change service.
For each new transaction, the service generates a new pseudonym. Again,
this does not consider that changing the pseudonym for each new transaction
may not be always appropriate, i.e., the user can be interested in reusing the
same pseudonym across different transactions if some benefit is expected.
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Moreover, AgentScape itself must be completely trusted. This is because
AgentScape knows the link of pseudonyms to each other and to the principal
involved. This usually implies that the organization or company that hosts
the specific system (e.g. eBay in the case of an e-marketplace) knows this
link as well. Therefore, this organization or company can collect and process
information constructing profiles about the users that run their agents on
the system.
Other more general agent-based approaches have been proposed to sup-
port pseudonymity in (van Blarkom et al., 2003) and (Such et al., 2011b).
Both approaches propose the use and integration of Privacy-Enhancing Tech-
nologies (PETs) and agent technologies. On the one hand, Van Blarkom et
al. (van Blarkom et al., 2003) propose the use of Identity Protectors. Identity
Protectors are in charge of converting the identity of the user involved into
one or more pseudonyms. They propose that the Identity Protector is placed
either between the user and the agent or between the agent and the environ-
ment. However, they do not provide any specific design or implementation
of an Identity Protector. On the other hand, Such et al. (2011b) present a
proposal based on the aforementioned PE-IMS. This proposal has been inte-
grated into the Magentix2 AP (Such et al., 2013b). In this way, Magentix2
relies identity management on external trusted Identity Providers, which are
PE-IMS. Therefore, this management is decoupled from the system where
the pseudonyms are to be used, and the system (e.g. eBay in the case of an
e-marketplace) would encounter more difficulties to perform the association
of pseudonyms to each other and to users9. Agents running in Magentix2
can obtain new pseudonyms at will and they can select which pseudonym to
use in their next interaction automatically. However, nothing is said about
when a pseudonym should be changed or not. That is, there are the tech-
nical means to change a pseudonym, but they would require direct human
intervention to decide whether a pseudonym change is appropriate or not.
Thus, as it has been identified in (Such et al., 2013a) and as we have pointed
out over the course of this article, automated control of buyer profiling by
9Note that this may not completely prevent information processing. There is still the
possibility that an agent running on Magentix2 or Magentix2 itself could collude with some
of the Identity Providers in order to be able to link a pseudonym to its corresponding real
identity. However, agents could (partially) address this by obtaining different pseudonyms
from different Identity Providers so as to decrease the probability of being traced back in
case of collusion (Such et al., 2013b).
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means of pseudonym changes was still an open challenge. In this article, we
have presented an approach for automated buyer profiling control based on
human attitudes towards privacy.
8. Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the
first automated mechanism for buyer profiling control based on pseudonym
changes in e-commerce environments. To this aim, our proposed mechanism
considers both the privacy/utility loss of reusing/changing a pseudonym. In
particular, agents decide whether to change a pseudonym or not based on the
specific attitude towards privacy of their users. This specific attitude is what
determines to what extent an agent values the privacy loss and the utility
of reusing/changing a pseudonym. We also contribute a general privacy loss
function that can be used in e-commerce environments that measures the
accuracy of the profile built by sellers based on previous interactions with
them.
We also presented an application scenario and the experiments we per-
formed to validate our proposed mechanism. The results we obtained prove
that changing pseudonyms can prevent buyer profiling in e-commerce scenar-
ios, though, of course, at the expense of the benefits of re-using a pseudonym
— this is actually the reason why a model like the one presented is needed,
because different persons with different privacy attitudes will see this expense
as acceptable or not to preserve their privacy. The results also validated that
the pseudonym changes suggested by our proposed mechanism will follow
the privacy attitude of the user involved. Moreover, we obtained results that
confirm that there are other factors that will determine the final number
of pseudonym changes needed to comply with a particular privacy attitude.
In particular, the results we obtained point out that the final number of
pseudonym changes to be performed will also depend on the complexity of
users’ tastes, i.e., users’ tastes that are more difficult to learn will imply less
privacy loss so that less pseudonym changes will be needed. Finally, we also
proved that the number of different sellers with whom the buyers interact
will also impact the number of pseudonym changes required to comply with
a given privacy attitude.
Finally, as future work we plan to develop a complete privacy-enhancing
agent-based e-marketplace application that will build on our mechanism pre-
sented in this paper implemented in agents running on top of the Magentix2
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agent platform. To this aim, there are still other functionalities that this ap-
plication would need to provide and that are beyond the scope of this paper,
e.g., models to search for sellers that sell the goods that buyers would like
to acquire, models that allow agents to select the most appropriate seller to
interact with from all the sellers that provide these goods, etc.
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